Cuba Policy Foundation 

Cuba Policy Foundation Press Release   

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – Monday, January 13, 2003    Contact: Brian Alexander  (202) 321-CUBA (2822)

         

CUBA AT THE START OF THE 108TH CONGRESS:

EMBARGO OPPONENTS MAINTAIN WINNING MAJORITIES ON KEY ISSUES, SETTING UP CONTEST WITH LEADERSHIP, ADMINISTRATION

         

Washington, D.C., January 13, 2003 – Congressional opponents of the Cuban embargo hold winning majorities on key issues going into the 108th Congress, according to an analysis by the Cuba Policy Foundation.  But the Congressional leadership tends to support the embargo, and may use parliamentary tactics and the Bush Administration’s backing to challenge a Congressional majority’s efforts to implement policy changes.  This sets the stage for a Congressional contest over Cuba in 2003.

  

House of Representatives:  By looking at the voting records of members of the 107th House returning to Congress in 2003, this analysis forecasts that embargo opponents will outnumber embargo supporters in the 108th House.  Using past voting records as indicators of future behavior is a commonly applied predictor of a member’s position, as members tend to be consistent in their positions from year to year.

   

In 2002, the House passed measures that would make it easier for Americans to travel to Cuba, sell agricultural products to Cuba, and send remittances to family and friends in Cuba.  An amendment supported by anti-embargo proponents to end enforcement of the entire embargo failed, as did an amendment supported by pro-embargo forces that would have tied Cuba to international terrorism.  The expiration of the Congressional calendar prohibited Cuba measures from reaching the final stages of becoming law, but in 2003, it is widely expected that the Congressional debate on the Cuban embargo will pick up where it left off.  (See CPF’s “Embargo Update,” 12/12/02, available: www.cubafoundation.org/congress.html)

  

Based on previous voting records of current members, opponents of the embargo hold winning majorities going into the 108th Congress.  Majorities exist on the issues of lifting the travel ban, expanding agricultural trade, ending the remittance cap, and opposing the linkage of Cuba to international terrorism.  Regarding a total lifting of the embargo, neither embargo opponents nor supporters hold a majority.  For passage of a provision in the House, 218 votes are required.  Analysis:

      

·         Flake Travel Amendment to HR-107-5120, 2002 (Sponsor: Jeff Flake (R-AZ)): The Flake amendment would have ended funding for enforcement of the travel ban, making it easier for Americans to travel to Cuba.  The Flake travel amendment passed July 23, 2002, by a vote of 262-167 (Roll Call No. 107-2-331).  Of members of Congress who voted on the Flake amendment and who are returning to Congress in 2003, supporters of the measure outnumber opponents 230-148.

   

·         Flake Amendment on Remittances to HR-107-5120, 2002 (Sponsor: Jeff Flake (R-AZ)): The remittances amendment would have ended enforcement of the $300 quarterly cap on moneys that Americans can send to friends and families in Cuba, ending what opponents of the cap called “a ban on charity.”  The remittances amendment passed on July 23, 2002, by a vote of 251-177 (Roll Call No. 107-2-332).  Of members of Congress who voted on the remittances amendment and who are returning to Congress in 2003, supporters of the measure outnumber opponents 222-156.

   

·         Goss Amendment on Cuba to HR-107-5120, 2002 (Sponsor: Porter Goss (R-FL)): The Goss amendment, which would have tied lifting the embargo to Presidential certification that Cuba is not supporting international terrorism, failed on July 23, 2002, by a vote of 182-247 (Roll Call Vote 107-2-330).  Of members of Congress who voted on the Goss amendment and who are returning to Congress in 2003, those who supported the amendment are outnumbered by opponents 160-218.

   

·         Dooley Motion to Instruct, 2002 (on H.R. 2646, Sponsor: Cal Dooley (D-CA)):  On April 23, 2002, the Dooley Motion to Instruct Conferees passed by a vote of 273-143 (Roll Call No. 107-2-105).  The Dooley motion was a non-binding provision that expressed House support for allowing the private finance of agricultural sales to Cuba.  Though non-binding, the Dooley motion was a symbolic gesture indicating strong support within the Congress for expanding trade with Cuba by making it easier for Americans to export farm products to Cuba.  Of members of Congress who voted on the Dooley motion and who are returning to Congress in 2003, supporters of the measure outnumber opponents 241-125.

   

·         Rangel Amendment on Cuba to HR5120, 2002 (Sponsor: Charles Rangel (D-NY)): The Rangel amendment would end funding for enforcement for the Cuban embargo, and, according to some, open the path for a total end to the embargo.  On July 23, 2002, the Rangel amendment failed by a vote of 204-226 (Roll Call No. 107-2-333).  Of members of Congress who voted on the Rangel amendment and who are returning to Congress in 2003, opponents of the measure outnumber supporters 180-200.  Therefore, neither supporters nor opponents of the Rangel provision hold majorities going into the 108th Congress.  Opponents of the Rangel amendment would have to pick up 18 votes in 2003 to maintain an upper hand, while Rangel supporters would have to pick-up 38 votes in 2003 for passage, should the amendment be offered again.

    

Senate: During the 107th Congress, only one vote took place by which to estimate returning Senators’ voting positions on the embargo.  An amendment by Senator Robert Smith (R-NH) would have required Presidential certification that the government of Cuba is not involved in support for acts of international terrorism as a condition precedent to U.S. agricultural trade with Cuba.  On December 18, 2001, the Smith amendment failed by a vote of 61-33 (Roll Call No. 107-1-375).  Of members of the Senate who voted on the Smith amendment and who are returning to the Senate in 2003, those who opposed the amendment outnumber supporters by 57-29.

   

Congressional Leadership as Wildcard:  Republicans control both the House and Senate in the 108th Congress.  While many rank-and-file Republicans oppose the embargo, the Republican leadership in each chamber tends to support the embargo.  Because of parliamentary rules governing the conduct of Congress, the Republican leadership holds disproportionate authority over rank and file members regarding what legislation can be voted on and the fate of any bill in the Congress.  Therefore, regardless of the majority opinions of Republicans and Democrats, leadership members can use their authority to employ parliamentary and other tactics to delay or thwart measures supported by the majority. 

 

According to Brian Alexander, Executive Director of the Cuba Policy Foundation, “The key question about the embargo is how long can a Congressional minority and the Administration oppose the majority support of the Congress and the American people for a change in Cuba policy?  This tension will be a central issue in 2003, as Congress reexamines the embargo.”

   

Some factors suggest that under Republican leadership, opponents of the Cuban embargo could prevail:

    

·        It was a Republican controlled House that passed 3 amendments to ease the embargo in July 2002, and the Dooley provision in April.

·        It was a Republican controlled House that defeated measures tying Cuba to terrorism in July 2002.

·        Ending the embargo has bipartisan support (e.g. the House Cuba Working Group, votes on the House floor, and Senators such as Hagel, Specter, Chafee, Roberts et al., along with numerous Democrats).

·        Richard Lugar, the new chairman of Senate Foreign Relations, is generally perceived to be more open toward easing the embargo on Cuba than previous chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC Ret.).

·        Many Republicans support easing the embargo, at both the national and local levels, creating internal pressures in the Republican party for changing policy toward Cuba. 

·        A strong Republican mandate in Florida and elsewhere may free the President’s hand slightly, allowing the Executive some flexibility in relation to domestic pressures on the Cuba issue. 

·        Ending the embargo makes sense for Republican reasons: expanding U.S. export markets to improve the U.S. economy and spread American influence and values is a position comfortable for many Republicans.

·        So-called “Red America,” the states that supported the President in 2000, are agricultural states that benefit the most from trade with Cuba.

  

 For more information, please contact the Cuba Policy Foundation.  ###