FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – Wednesday, April 9, 2003
Contact: Brian Alexander; Tel: (202) 321-CUBA (2822); Email:
alexander@cubafoundation.org
EMBARGO
UPDATE:
CONGRESS
REACTS TO CASTRO’S CRACK-DOWN:
THE
CHARM OFFENSIVE IS OVER, BUT WHAT COURSE TO EXPECT IN U.S. POLICY?
Responding
to the severest crack-down by the Castro government on human rights activists
in recent memory, on Tuesday, April 8, 2003, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed by an extraordinary 414-0, a resolution ”regarding the systematic human
rights violations in Cuba committed by the Castro regime; calling for the
immediate release of all political prisoners and supporting free elections for
Cuba.” The measure (H. Res. 108-179) was
introduced by Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL21), one of the most strident
defenders of the U.S. embargo. In a telling signal of Congressional outrage
over the dissident crack-down, all but one Representative of the 50 member
House Cuba Working Group, a coalition formed with the intention of easing the
embargo, supported the Diaz-Balart resolution.
Specifically,
the House resolution was a reaction to arrests by the Castro government in
March of over 80 Cuban dissidents, human rights activists, independent
journalists, trade union leaders and others, and the subsequent sentencing of
many of these individuals to year jail terms as long as 27 years. Amnesty International has suggested that many
of those detained may be prisoners of conscious, whose only offense may be ”the
non-violent exercise of their rights to freedom of expression and association,”
a view widely reflected in a growing list of other organizations and
governments who have condemned the arrests and sentencing. For the latest coverage of the arrests, visit
www.cubanet.org/cubanews.html.
Tensions
in the U.S.-Cuba relationship are leading many to question what course to
expect in U.S. policy toward Cuba in the months ahead. Over the past several years, anti-embargo
proponents have grown in strength and number, both in South Florida and across the United States. Several measures to ease the embargo passed
in the House and Senate during the last Congress, including efforts to end
enforcement of the travel ban, lift the restriction on private finance of farm
sales, and others. In both the House and
the Senate, bipartisan Cuba Working Groups have been formed with the goals of
easing the embargo. And, a January 2003
analysis by the Cuba Policy Foundation indicates that majorities exist in both
chambers for an end to the travel ban.
Is
such momentum for a change in U.S. policy toward Cuba now lost due to
Castro’s crackdown on dissidents?
Indeed, it seems safe to say that the “charm offensive” by the Castro
government is over. That is, the
apparent strategy by the Cuban government to appeal to members of Congress
through politically targeted farm purchases, and efforts to court American
public opinion have been trumped by actions against human rights activists that
are woefully unacceptable by most Americans’ standards.
How
the crackdown will impact efforts to ease the Cuban embargo, such as those led
by the House and Senate Cuba Working Groups, has yet to be determined. But close observation of several factors will
be instructive on which direction the Cuba policy debate will take
in the months to come.
First,
is the question of how far Castro will go toward increasing tensions and
souring relations? Many observers were
surprised by the severity of the crackdown, given growing support among the
U.S. Congress and the American people for a change in Cuba policy and Cuba’s assertion that
lifting the embargo is one of its top foreign policy priorities. The Cuban government claims to be reacting to
“provocations” by the chief U.S. diplomat in
Havana, James Cason, who had
met with many of those dissidents arrested.
This would signal an apparent shift in focus by Castro toward the U.S. executive branch, which
as President Bush has indicated, is intent on maintaining the embargo, at the
potential expense undermining efforts by those in the legislature who would
support easing the embargo.
Castro
already has taken a first step, in addition to the initial crackdown, toward
setting the U.S.-Cuba debate on a negative course. The sentencing, so far, of at least half of
those arrested, many for twenty year terms, makes it less likely that the
dissident crackdown can soon be forgotten as long as dissidents are held in Cuba’s prisons. Members of Congress on delegations to Cuba had met personally with
several of those who have been given decades-long jail terms, including
prominent dissident Martha Beatriz Roque and
others.
A
second indicator of the direction that Havana wishes to take relations with the
United States would be the provocation of some kind of obvious crisis, such as
the expulsion of U.S. diplomats or the closing of the U.S. Interests Section in
Havana, the unleashing of a rafter crisis, or some other bold, dramatic act,
perhaps akin to the 1996 episode wherein the Cuban government shot-down two
U.S. planes over international waters.
A
third, indicator of the direction Havana may take relations
relates to Cuban purchases of U.S. agricultural
commodities. In 2002, Cuba purchased $138 million
in U.S. farm goods, under a
2000 U.S. law allowing such
sales, which made Cuba a top-fifty U.S. agricultural export
market. These sales fueled interest
among Americans in trade opportunities in Cuba, and bolstered the
already growing push in the United States for easing the
embargo. Should Cuba reduce such purchases, it
could have the short-term effect of reducing commercially-driven American
interest in easing the embargo. A more
subtle shift in commercial relations would be if Cuba reduces politically targeted
agricultural purchases. The Cuban
government made little secret of a strategy of attempting to stimulate interest
for easing the embargo by making farm purchases from key states or
Congressional districts of members of Congress who may support easing the
embargo. Even if Cuba continues making farm
purchases from the United States, a reduction in
targeted purchases could indicate something about Havana’s intentions. It is important to note that, to date, there
are no indications that farm purchases have slowed.
What, then,
to expect from U.S. lawmakers? A key determinant of the course that the U.S. debate over the embargo will take
relates to the way in which the dialogue – the rhetoric – over Cuba among lawmakers and among the
American people takes shape in the days and weeks ahead. On the one hand, arguments for easing the
embargo and seeking a fresh approach toward Cuba are as credible today as they were
a month ago. That is, easing the embargo
would be in America’s national and economic interest,
and would be a productive step toward eventual political and economic reform in
Cuba. Dislodging
Castro through sanctions has failed, and the latest set of deplorable behavior
by the Castro government only confirms what was previously known about Cuba’s repressive regime.
However,
should the debate remain fixated on Castro’s actions rather what would be an
effective U.S. policy to advance America’s national interest and to affect a
positive change in Cuba, sentiments for opening the embargo could be lost among
the chorus of cries condemning Castro.
The dissident crackdown provides pro-embargo hardliners with such an
opportunity to take control of the Cuba debate. Whether they will succeed remains to be seen,
and depends on the manner in which lawmakers focus on Castro versus focusing on
American interests and a productive policy for bringing change to Cuba.
Another
element to monitor in the U.S. policy debate is the role of United States’ so-called “track two” efforts to
promote civil society and democracy in Cuba.
Mr. Cason’s meetings with dissidents were part of a vigorous track-two
program by the Bush administration. One
effect of this program, however, was to provide the Castro government with
justification (albeit bogus) for rounding-up dissidents on the grounds that
they are agents of the U.S. government – amounting to what one observer called
a “decapitation” of Cuba’s dissident movement.
As this debate takes shape, some will argue that the crackdown was a
sign of the success of track two, because Castro’s reaction indicates that he
viewed it as a threat. Others will
suggest that track two backfired, and that civil society in Cuba is now worse off than ever. The crackdown is likely to increase the sense
of urgency with regard to the need for successful programs to promote political
reform in Cuba; while track two the debate may
differ with respect to method, it is likely to be unified on goals.
The Cuba
Policy Foundation will monitor the Cuba debate and its ongoing
developments. Please contact the Cuba
Policy Foundation for more information or with questions or comments. ###